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Future of Skills in Europe 
Convergence or polarisation? 
Miroslav Beblavý and Marcela Veselková* 
CEPS Working Document No. 390 / February 2014 
1. Introduction 
The importance of human capital for Europe’s future and the emphasis placed by the 
European social model on both dynamism and inclusion have become a cliché. In this Policy 
Brief we examine whether the current trends in the areas of education and skills are pushing 
the European Union, composed of 28 member states and hundreds of millions of citizens, 
towards convergence or polarisation? 
Polarisation or convergence can be analysed with regard to countries, but also within 
countries and education systems. In this Brief, based on NEUJOBS research conducted by the 
Centre for European Policy Studies, Slovak Governance Institute and the Conference Board 
Europe, we cover a wide range of topics related to the main issue. What can we expect as 
higher education is extended to the masses? Is it just lack of information that leads students 
to choose social sciences rather than mathematics? Is later tracking of students truly the 
answer to education inequality and how likely is it to be politically successful? Is job 
polarisation by skills happening in Europe and why? How frequent are the new ‘green’ skills 
and can they contribute to more equality? How can low-skilled individuals improve their 
skills – going back to school or learning on the job? And what does it mean to be a low-
skilled after all? 
All of these questions and more are covered in this Brief, which tries to convert dry academic 
papers into something that policy-makers, journalists and concerned citizens will read and, 
hopefully, enjoy. 
2. What happens with the extension of upper secondary and higher 
education to the general population? 
As universal primary and secondary education has been a reality for a considerable time in 
the developed countries, efforts have been directed towards higher education. These efforts 
have been reinforced by the growing body of work that suggests that the impact of 
investment in education and training on national economic growth is positive and 
significant, although difficult to quantify. In light of the recognition that higher education is 
crucial for economic development and job creation, the European Union agreed the target 
that at least 40% of 30-to-34-year-olds should have a higher education qualification or the 
                                                   
* Miroslav Beblavý is Senior Research Fellow, CEPS and Coordinator of the NEUJOBS project. Marcela 
Veselková is Assistant Professor at the Faculty of Social and Economic Sciences, Comenius University 
in Bratislava, and a Senior Research Fellow at Slovak Governance Institute. The authors gratefully 
acknowledge research contributions by Bert Colijn, Lucia Mýtna Kureková, Ilaria Maselli and Anna-
Elisabeth Thum as well as useful comments by Corina Haita, Galina Potjagailo, Mariya 
Teteryiatnikova and Marten von Werder. 
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equivalent by 2020. According to the European Commission,1 11 EU countries have already 
exceeded the 2020 target. In contrast, the lowest completion rates could be found in the 
southern and Central European countries, despite the fact that they have very high 
secondary education completion rates. Various projections of the extension to tertiary 
education suggest that higher education systems will probably continue to expand but that 
the continued growth of ‘massification’ is beset by many uncertainties. 
Instead of examining the expansion of tertiary education directly, we examined broad trends 
in the expansion of upper secondary education, which has to precede expansion of tertiary 
education. The time span encompasses the post-World War II period, which witnessed a 
rapid expansion of upper secondary education in Europe. In case of speed of the expansion, 
two hypothetical benchmarks were set: i) extension of higher education, characterised by a 
transition from 20% to 50% gross enrolment rates, and ii) universalisation of education 
characterised by a transition from 50% to 80% gross enrolment rates.2 
Based on our research, it took 9 to 26 years for a country to massify its upper secondary 
education to the masses and an additional 11 to 41 years to universalise it, with gross 
enrolment rates reaching 80%. Although the data should be interpreted with caution due to 
differences in the organisation of national schooling systems, it is clear that countries 
expanded their upper secondary sectors at various speed. The expansion was slower in the 
leaders of expansion, such as the United Kingdom or Sweden. In contrast, laggards were 
able to catch up relatively fast, once the limiting conditions were removed. The results also 
suggest that universalisation of upper secondary sector was faster than universalisation of 
the primary or lower secondary schooling. A proxy of enrolment with literacy acquisition 
found that the typical country in the post-war 20th century took 35-80 years to make the 
transition from 10% net primary enrolment to 90%.3 
It is possible to derive several lessons about the consequences of educational expansion. As 
the enrolment rates exceed 80%, we observe two trends. First, the demand for part-time 
secondary or post-secondary non-tertiary education in Slovakia and the Czech Republic 
declines and the demand for flexible forms of more prestigious tertiary education rises.4 The 
demand for post-secondary education thus shifts almost exclusively to the tertiary level. It is 
possible to hypothesise that this shift occurs as a result of a combination of two factors: 
elimination of the quotas on the number of students in tertiary education and a better 
signalling function of tertiary education as opposed to post-secondary non-tertiary 
education. Second, the generalisation of the upper secondary schooling seems to have spilled 
to the bachelor studies. For example, in Germany, the specialisation occurs only at the 
Masters or PhD level. Both of these findings suggest that it is reasonable to assume that 
students will be staying on in education longer and longer.  
                                                   
1 European Commission (2011), Progress towards the common European objectives in education and 
training (2010/2011) – Indicators and benchmarks, Brussels (http://ec.europa.eu/education/lifelong-
learning-policy/indicators10_en.htm). 
2 Boundaries are set as 15% for a transition from elite to mass education and 50% as a transition from 
mass to universal. M.A. Trow (2006), “Reflections on the Transition from Elite to Mass to Universal 
Access: Forms and Phases of Higher Education in Modern Societies since WWII”, in James J.F. Forest 
and Philip G. Altbach (eds), International Handbook of Higher Education, Dordrecht: Springer. 
3 See M.A. Clemens (2004), “The Long Walk to School: International Education Goals in Historical 
Perspective”, Working Paper No. 37, Center for Global Development, March. 
4 See M. Veselkova (2013), “Political Economy of Comprehensive School Reforms: Czech and Slovak 
Lands after World War I”, in M. Beblavý and M. Veselkova (eds), “From Selectivity to Universalism: 
The Political Economy of Pro-Equality Educational Reform”, NEUJOBS Working Paper No. 4.5.2, 
NEUJOBS FP7 Research Project, July (http://www.neujobs.eu/). 
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We observe a similar trend at the tertiary level: expansion of tertiary education in Europe 
occurred hand in hand with a redistribution of students across different fields of study. A 
growing number of studies has examined returns to investment in education. For example, 
in OECD countries, returns to an additional year of tertiary education are on average above 
8% and range from 4 to 15% across different countries.5 However, looking at average values 
is not satisfactory.  
Our research6 therefore asks a simple question: Is it worth studying engineering or art? To 
answer this question, we calculated the net present value of university studies for five 
European countries. Reference populations were the 2,000 cohort of graduates in France and 
Italy and the 2002-03 cohort in Hungary, Poland and Slovenia. It was found that with the 
exception of Italy, private investment in education largely repays itself after five years. 
However, the field of study is a source of inequality within the group of higher education 
graduates: both the resources needed during university and the returns five years later 
depend on the field of study. Surprisingly, it is not STEM faculties that ensure the highest 
return on investment. Rather, social sciences graduates enjoy the highest returns. In contrast, 
graduates of art, humanities and education enjoy the lowest net present value. These 
findings suggest that the expansion of enrolment in fields of study such as economics, 
business or law is driven by a rational choice. This is particularly true in Central and Eastern 
European countries. Gender is an additional source of heterogeneity: being a woman and 
enrolling into STEM is the worst option in Italy, France, Slovenia and Hungary.   
Is it possible to steer students into preferred majors? The empirical evidence suggests that it 
is very difficult. Policy-makers in communist Czechoslovakia were able to effectively direct 
the expansion of the secondary education into vocational tracks, thanks to the combination 
of a highly centralised educational system and a system of administrative quotas on the 
number of students advanced to general upper-secondary tracks.7 In the post-communist 
period, the ability of policy-makers to manage expansion was undermined by the emergence 
of quasi-markets. Private institutions were more than eager to meet the demand unmet by 
public providers of education. The surge in student enrolment in private education is 
characteristic also of the tertiary level. Regionally, it concentrated in the part of Europe 
where the establishment of private higher-education institutions was prevented for several 
decades namely Central and Eastern Europe. One of the major forces that contributed to the 
expansion of the private higher education has been the continuous and strong expansion of 
this sector globally.8 
The fast expansion of the private education and the willingness to bear some or all of the 
costs of higher education suggests that tuition fees are a poor instrument to entice students 
to redistribute towards science majors. Using the data on all US public 4-year colleges and 
universities from 1991 to 2006, Hemelt and Marcotte’s research shows that a $100 increase in 
                                                   
5 R. Boarini and H. Strauss (2010), “What is the private return to tertiary education? New evidence 
from 21 OECD countries”, OECD Journal: Economic Studies, Vol. 2010. 
6  M. Beblavý, S. Lehouelleur and I. Maselli (2013), “Useless Degrees or Useless Statistics? A 
Comparison of the Net Present Value of Higher Education by Field of Study in Five European 
Countries”, NEUJOBS Working Paper No. 4.4.2a, NEUJOBS FP7 Research Project, July 
(http://www.neujobs.eu/). 
7 See M. Veselkova (2013), “Political Economy of Comprehensive School Reforms: Czech and Slovak 
Lands after World War I”, in M. Beblavý and M. Veselkova (eds), “From Selectivity to Universalism: 
The Political Economy of Pro-Equality Educational Reform”, NEUJOBS Working Paper No. 4.5.2, 
NEUJOBS FP7 Research Project, July (http://www.neujobs.eu/). 
8 Ibid. 
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tuition and fees would lead to a decline in enrolment of about 0.25%, with larger effects at 
research universities. 9  The weak response of enrolment to increases in tuition fees is 
probably the result of a weak impact of tuition fees on the rate of return to education. A 
degree from the most expensive colleges translates into the highest premia in the labour 
market. For example, the median starting salary for Ivy Leaguers is 32% higher than that of 
liberal-arts college graduates – and at 10 or more years into graduates' working lives, the 
spread is 34%, according to the survey.10 
3. Is later tracking a necessary and a sufficient condition of equality 
of educational opportunities? 
Our findings support the view that although elite, mass and universal access to education 
are sequential stages of educational expansion, they do not inevitably replace one another. 
The research documents examples of elite forms of education stubbornly surviving in the 
mass and universal stages, e.g. elite grammar schools in the United Kingdom, Gymnasia in 
Germany and multi-year gymnasia in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. These examples 
suggest that expansion – if not accompanied by policies aimed at greater equality of 
educational opportunities – will perpetuate social stratification despite greater participation 
in upper-secondary schooling.  
Two types of education policies are linked with equality of educational opportunities, i.e. 
decoupling educational success from the family background (the age of tracking) and early 
childhood education. There is a growing body of literature that suggests that the earlier 
students are tracked, the more their family background will have an impact on their student 
performance. In highly stratified educational systems – characterised by early and 
irreversible assignment of students to a number of tracks – the future of the child may thus 
be decided as early as the age of 10. Consequently, there has been a strong push associated 
most visibly with the OECD for a policy change towards later tracking, especially with its 
legitimacy buttressed by PISA. Our research adds to this debate by examining the 
association between within-school ability grouping and equality of educational 
opportunities for differently performing students, regardless of their academic performance. 
We study the issue at a country level for four OECD countries (Austria, Belgium, Hungary 
and Finland), which we selected on the basis of how conditional PISA performance 
distributions react to ability grouping. 11  Results shown in Figure 1 demonstrate very 
different results for the countries concerned. This applies both to average results and results 
for low and high performers. In Belgium low performers are more strongly concerned with 
inequality effects of within-school ability grouping, whereas in Austria the high performers 
are more concerned with these inequality effects. In Hungary, we find that within-school 
ability grouping is positively correlated with equality and more so for the high performers. 
In Finland within-school ability grouping does not appear to have a significant relation with 
equality.  
                                                   
9 S.W. Hemelt and D.E. Marcotte (2011), “The Impact of Tuition Increases on Enrollment at Public 
Colleges and Universities”, Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis, Vol. 33, No. 4, pp. 435-457. 
10  Wall Street Journal (2008), “Ivy leaguers' big edge: Starting pay”, 31 July 
(http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121746658635199271.html). 
11 M. Beblavý, A. Thum, G. Potjagailo and M. von Werder (2013), “A closer look at the effects of 
within-school ability grouping in secondary schools: How are different performers affected? An 
investigation into four OECD countries”, unpublished manuscript. 
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In other words, the effects of tracking are so deeply mediated by other characteristics of the 
education system that policy-makers should avoid global generalisations and focus on 
specific country situations. 
Figure 1. Effect of socioeconomic gradient for children of different ability - Austria, Belgium, Finland 
and Hungary 
 
 
Source: M. Beblavý, A. Thum and G. Potjagailo (2012), “Do the Effects of Pro-Equality Education 
Policies Differ across the Performance Distribution?”, NEUJOBS Working Paper No. 4.5.3., 
July, p. 30 (http://www.neujobs.eu/). 
NEUJOBS also studied the equality of educational opportunities from the policy 
perspective.12 The explanation why countries adopt or do not adopt pro-equality educational 
policies was examined. The research focused on the policy process, which introduced 
various elements of less selective (or comprehensive) schooling, such as later age at which 
children are selected to follow various tracks, elimination of dead-end educational pathways 
or increased mobility between tracks. It relied on a comparative case study of five European 
countries with varying degrees of success in the introduction of less-selective educational 
systems in the period following World War II: success (Sweden), failure (Germany), formal 
implementation of the reform and informal transfer of selection to the private schooling 
sector (United Kingdom), success followed by the reversal (Czechoslovakia) and success 
associated with increased dropout rates (Spain). 
                                                   
12 M. Beblavý and M. Veselkova (eds) (2013), “From Selectivity to Universalism: Political Economy of 
Pro-Equality Educational Reform”, NEUJOBS Working Paper No. 4.5.2, CEPS, Brussels, July; M. 
Beblavý and M. Veselkova et al. (2013), “Lessons From the Expansion of the Upper Secondary 
Education for the Expansion of the Tertiary Education”, NEUJOBS Working Paper No. 4.4.1, 
NEUJOBS FP7 Research Project, July (http://www.neujobs.eu/). 
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There has been a gradual improvement in the equality of educational opportunities in the 
post-World War II period. Educational systems today are less selective than they were 60 
years ago. Nevertheless, there are still significant differences among countries, or rather 
among various educational models. A general preference towards selection is still strong 
within the German educational model, which favours early selection of students into 
academic and vocational tracks. The movement towards increased equality of educational 
opportunities has been accompanied by a counter-movement, which attempts to re-
introduce earlier selection along the lines of increased efficiency. The importance of 
competition as the main driver of educational quality has been promoted under the umbrella 
of neo-liberalism and gained prominence in the national discourses of countries that faced 
economic downturn or financial crises, such as Sweden in the 1990s.  
What are the main drivers of the movement towards earlier or later selection? Our study 
differentiates between two types of factors, which are roughly equal to extraordinary 
circumstances vs. business as usual. 13  Extraordinary circumstances, or critical junctures, 
represent events that are beyond the policy control. Typical examples include an economic 
crisis or a regime change. They open ‘windows of opportunity’,14 which may or may not be 
used by policy entrepreneurs, who attempt to translate these external shocks into policy 
change. The above-mentioned reorganisation of educational systems along neo-liberal lines 
is a typical example of the shift in the ‘policy paradigm’15  in the face of widespread 
perception of policy failure. 
External shocks are difficult or impossible to predict. From the policy perspective, it is 
therefore more interesting to study the policy process during ordinary times. We document 
three factors that enabled the introduction of less selective schooling. First, left-leaning 
parties tended to be in favour of less selective schooling more than the right-leaning political 
parties. Election of a strong, leftist government enabled ‘comprehensivisation’ of educational 
systems in post-World War II Sweden and post-Franco Spain.16 The Labor Party initiated the 
process of reorganisation of educational system towards less selective schooling also in the 
                                                   
13 M. Beblavý and M. Veselkova (eds) (2013), “From Selectivity to Universalism: Political Economy of 
Pro-Equality Educational Reform”, NEUJOBS Working Paper No. 4.5.2, CEPS, Brussels, July 
(http://www.neujobs.eu/). 
14 According to J. Kingdon (1994), Agendas, Ideas, and Policy Change, 2nd ed., New York: HarperCollins; 
see also M. Beblavý and M. Veselkova (eds) (2013), “From Selectivity to Universalism: Political 
Economy of Pro-Equality Educational Reform”, NEUJOBS Working Paper No. 4.5.2, CEPS, Brussels, 
July (http://www.neujobs.eu/). 
15 See more on the theory of policy paradigms in P.A. Hall (1993), “Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, 
and the State: The Case of Economic Policymaking in Britain”, Comparative Politics, Vol. 25, No. 3, pp. 
275-296. 
16 Although in that case, the regime change and the eagerness to negate the past played some role. For 
the Swedish case, see E. Peterson (2013), “Education Policy Reform in Sweden: Towards a 
Comprehensive School - and Back Again?”, in M. Beblavý and M. Veselkova (eds), “From Selectivity 
to Universalism: The Political Economy of Pro-Equality Educational Reform”, NEUJOBS Working 
Paper No. 4.5.2, NEUJOBS FP7 Research Project, July (http://www.neujobs.eu/), and for the Spanish 
case, see N. Pensiero (2013), “Education Reform in Spain: Actors and Consequences of an Incomplete 
Transformation”, in M. Beblavý and M. Veselkova (eds), “From Selectivity to Universalism: The 
Political Economy of Pro-Equality Educational Reform”, NEUJOBS Working Paper No. 4.5.2, 
NEUJOBS FP7 Research Project, July (http://www.neujobs.eu/). 
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United Kingdom. The communist Party in Czechoslovakia introduced ‘unified school’ up to 
the age of 15 within one year from the coup d’état in 1948.17 
Second, in our study18 we document that the dissemination of research has an impact on the 
prevailing beliefs about human intelligence and about the link between the age of tracking 
and the educational performance. For that purpose, international circulation of pedagogical 
knowledge and models in three broad waves were examined in the research. In the 
beginning of the 20th century, the educational discourse was dominated by the ideas of the 
progressivist movement, which quickly spread to the rest of the world. Comprehensive 
schooling at the secondary level was for the first time introduced in the United States. Direct 
influence of the progressivist movement was documented in three out of five case studies 
(Germany, Sweden and Czechoslovakia). However, with a single exception of Sweden, these 
ideas did not translate into policy change despite several decades of research dissemination, 
rise of reformists to decision-making positions or experience with experimental schools. 
Furthermore, whereas reform attempts inspired by the progressivist movement in Germany 
or Czechoslovakia culminated in the period prior to the World War II or immediately 
afterwards, the Swedish reform stretched from the 1950s to the 1960s. 
In the post-World War II period, the prevailing beliefs about intelligence changed. 
Traditionally, it was believed that there are various types of intelligence suited for various 
types of education. Bright pupils should be educated separately from slower students and 
this separation benefits both groups. We observe these beliefs in the United Kingdom, 
Sweden, Czechoslovakia and Germany. The British tripartite system rested on the widely 
held belief, propagated by the educational psychologist Cyril Burt, that intelligence was an 
innate mental ability, that could be assessed through intelligence tests, and which bore a 
strong relationship with social class. These ideas were reflected in the White Paper that 
preceded the 1944 Education Act: “all children should receive the type of education for 
which they are best adapted.”19 The change in the sentiment came with a paradigm shift in 
the field of psychology at the end of the 1950s. The prevailing theories of innate intelligence 
were discredited and an emphasis was placed on social factors. This perspective found 
resonance in subsequent official reports, including the landmark Robbins and Newsom 
Reports which claimed that all children had an equal opportunity to “develop intelligence”.20 
Thus, the distilling of a new orthodoxy – the psychology of intelligence – coupled with 
mounting evidence on the unsatisfactory operation of the tripartite system created the 
setting for the reforms aiming to abolish tracking. 
Both German and the German-influenced Czechoslovakian educational models rested on the 
belief that weak students could make the strong weaker and thereby reduce quality.21 These 
                                                   
17 M. Veselkova (2013), “Political Economy of Comprehensive School Reforms: Czech and Slovak 
Lands after World War I”, in M. Beblavý and M. Veselkova (eds), “From Selectivity to Universalism: 
The Political Economy of Pro-Equality Educational Reform”, NEUJOBS Working Paper No. 4.5.2, 
NEUJOBS FP7 Research Project, July (http://www.neujobs.eu/). 
18 M. Beblavý and M. Veselkova (eds) (2013), “From Selectivity to Universalism: Political Economy of 
Pro-Equality Educational Reform”, NEUJOBS Working Paper No. 4.5.2, NEUJOBS FP7 Research 
Project, July (http://www.neujobs.eu/). 
19  White Paper: Educational Reconstruction (1943), London: Board of Education, p. 7 
(http://www.educationengland.org.uk/documents/wp1943/educational-reconstruction.html). 
20  The Newsom Report (1963), “Half our future”, report of the Central Advisory Council for 
Education, Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, London, p. iv 
(http://www.educationengland.org.uk/documents/newsom/newsom1963.html). 
21 On the German case, see S.B. Robinsohn and J.C. Kuhlmann (1967), “Two Decades of Non-Reform 
in West German Education”, Comparative Education Review, Vol. 11, No. 3, pp. 323-324; on 
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ideas can be trace back to the philosopher Alexander von Humboldt (1769-1859), a founding 
father of the Gymnasium. The dominating beliefs changed in the 1970s when the ‘Copernican 
education rebound’ (Kopernikanische Bildungswende) took place: the belief in an innate 
predestination for the different school types was replaced by the belief in a universal ability 
to be educated. This is the climate in which the idea of the comprehensive Gemeinschaftsschule 
came up.  
Most recently, it was the PISA Programme of the OECD, which has shown an unprecedented 
impact on the national educational discourses. In Germany, the PISA shock influenced 
educational discourse and led to a wide-ranging reform agenda, shifted curriculum 
development process towards principles such as outcome control, competence orientation or 
external assessment, and strengthened the role of empirical research in academic discourse. 
Similarly, in the Czech Republic, results of the first PISA testing debunked the myth that 
Czech students were above-average and reinforced the belief that educational policy should 
address the problem of early tracking.22  The strategic document White Paper published 
shortly afterwards therefore called for the introduction of mechanisms in order that the 
educational system does not further reproduce existing inequalities. These developments 
were mirrored also in Slovakia, where both the right-leaning and the left-leaning Ministers of 
Education endorsed recommendations of OECD to reduce early stratification in the 
educational system. In response, the Slovak cabinet decided to introduce the quotas on the 
number of children that would be allowed to enrol to elite multi-year secondary schools.  
Finally, the shift in the prevailing beliefs about intelligence is a necessary but not a sufficient 
condition for the policy change towards less selective schooling. The convergence towards 
the international model or the best practice advocated by international organisations, such as 
the OECD or UNESCO, is problematic in countries with strong national academic traditions. 
The strong tradition of the German Gymnasium works as an obstacle to reorganisation of the 
secondary schooling. 
However, implementation of the reform aimed at less selective schooling is complicated also 
by other factors, notably the stable social and political balance of forces: parents with high 
socio-economic status and teachers from elite academic tracks vehemently oppose 
comprehensivisation of education. Their typical defence strategy is to reframe the issue of 
later tracking as socialist or detrimental to the development of gifted children. It is therefore 
crucial for policy-makers to avoid the capture of the public discourse by opponents of the 
reform. An example of the successful strategy was the successful framing of comprehensive 
schooling as a means for the mobilisation of the country's resources and the pathway to 
wealth creation by the British Labour Party in the 1960s. 
Based on the above, it is possible to identify two broad trends that are likely to affect future 
levels of equality of educational opportunities. First, there has been a gradual shift towards 
greater equality of educational opportunities during the past century. Continuing advocacy 
                                                                                                                                                               
Czechoslovak case, see M. Veselkova (2013), “Political Economy of Comprehensive School Reforms: 
Czech and Slovak Lands after World War I”, in M. Beblavý and M. Veselkova (eds), “From Selectivity 
to Universalism: The Political Economy of Pro-Equality Educational Reform”, NEUJOBS Working 
Paper No. 4.5.2, NEUJOBS FP7 Research Project, July (http://www.neujobs.eu/). 
22  See J. Kotásek (2009), “Bílá kniha po pěti letech”, 18 November 2009 (http://www.ucitelske-
listy.cz/2009/11/jiri-kotasek-bila-kniha-po-peti-letech.html); P. Holub (2010), “Daň za gymnázia pro 
elitu. České děti ve světě propadly”, 8 December (http://aktualne.centrum.cz/domaci/spolecnost/ 
clanek.phtml?id=685014); P. Holub (2007), “České školství se nelepší, ukázalo mezinárodní srovnání” 
(http://aktualne.centrum.cz/domaci/spolecnost/clanek.phtml?id=515634); R. Mertlík (1947), 
Nebezpečí jednotné školy, Praha: Nakladatel Václav Petr. 
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of later tracking by international organisations, such as the OECD or UNESCO, will create 
incentives for governments to converge towards the ‘best practice’. However, the impetus is 
weaker in countries with strong academic traditions. Furthermore, the case of 
Czechoslovakia documents that the policies based on later tracking are not irreversible.   
Second, the continuing privatisation of educational systems will work as the counterforce to 
the above trend. As a result of the neoliberal revolution, the monopoly of state as the 
provider of the education has eroded and we witness an increasing privatisation of the 
public sphere. Free school choice may undermine efforts to increase equality of educational 
opportunities because if “schools and children are free to seek each other out: with some 
caveats, this leads to perfect segregation by child quality.”23 In England, sorting by ability 
and by income is greater, where there is more choice to attend other than the residential 
school. In Sweden the school choice not only raised differences between schools and school 
areas in ability but also in social and immigrant status.  
4. Job polarisation based on skills is happening in Europe 
During the decade 1998-2008, occupational polarisation based on skills emerged across 
Europe, with a rising demand at the upper and lower ends of the occupational skills 
distribution. The share of elementary occupations in total employment increased from 8.7% 
in 2000 to 9.6% in 2008. These findings were also supported by our research.24 We analysed 
labour demand and supply with respect to skills and tasks and attempts to anticipate what 
types of skills mismatch will EU countries encounter over the next decade.  
Figure 1 below illustrates the job polarisation phenomenon in the EU-27 between 2000 and 
2010. What we would normally expect is that demand for workers rises as the skill content of 
these occupations increases in a linear fashion. Instead, the picture is U-shaped, as predicted 
by job polarisation, and it is the result of an approximately 20% increase in the demand for 
low-skilled and high-profile occupations between 2000 and 2010 and a 4.5% decrease in the 
demand for middle-skilled occupations. Polarisation occurred in 17 out of 27 EU countries.25  
                                                   
23 D. Robertson and J. Symons (2003), “Self-Selection in the State School System”, Education Economics, 
Vol. 11, No. 3, p. 259. 
24 I. Maselli. (2012), “The Evolving Supply and Demand of Skills in the Labour Market”, Intereconomics, 
Vol. 47, No. 1, p. 29; L. Kureková, C. Haita and M. Beblavý (2013a), “Being and Becoming Low-Skilled: 
A Comprehensive Approach to Studying Low-Skillness”, NEUJOBS Working Paper No. 4.3.1, 
NEUJOBS FP7 Research Project, December (http://www.neujobs.eu/). 
25  Diversified occupational polarization across countries and its concentration of polarization in 
service sectors was documented also by CEDEFOP (2011), “Labour-Market Polarisation and 
Elementary Occupations in Europe. Blip or Long-Term Trend?”, CEDEFOP Research Paper No. 9, 
Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg. 
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Figure 2. Job polarisation in the EU-27, 2000-10 
 
Source: I. Maselli. (2012), “The Evolving Supply and Demand of Skills in the Labour Market”, 
Intereconomics, Vol. 47, No. 1, p. 23. 
The next figure depicts the match between the labour demand and labour supply. The share 
of middle-skilled occupations in total employment is 50.4%, and the share of the labour 
supply with a secondary degree is 48.2%. However, these trends are moving in opposite 
directions: the latter has grown by 13.2%, while the former has declined by 4.5%. The share 
of low-skilled workers is small (22.2%) and rapidly decreasing (-15.2%), most probably due 
to a phasing out of the older and less educated generation from the labour force. The 
percentage of low-skilled occupations increased by 18.4%, resulting in a 9.8% share of these 
types of jobs in the economy. One-third of the total labour force is highly educated, and the 
size of this group grew by 44.9% over the period 2000-10. Meanwhile, demand for these 
workers grew more modestly (23%), but still accounted for 39.8% of total employment. 
However, one should bear in mind that there are significant differences between countries 
(see Table 1 below).  
Table 1. Static and dynamic match between the labour demand and labour supply by country 
 
Source: I. Maselli. (2012), “The Evolving Supply and Demand of Skills in the Labour Market”, 
Intereconomics, Vol. 47, No. 1, p. 28. 
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Figure 3. Demand and supply of work with respect to skills/tasks in the EU-27, 2000-10 
 
Source: I. Maselli. (2012), “The Evolving Supply and Demand of Skills in the Labour Market”, 
Intereconomics, Vol. 47, No. 1, p. 26. 
The literature identifies several possible drivers of polarisation: skill-biased technological 
change, educational expansion, growth of the service sector, trade liberalisation, employer 
preferences and organisational change.26 CEDEFOP attributes the occupation polarisation in 
Europe to three factors: macroeconomic and structural changes (between sectors), the 
demand-driven increase in specific service activities (e.g. private household) and the 
increasing labour supply of non-national workers. CEDEFOP suggests that the relative 
increase in elementary occupations is bound to persist in the near future because of the 
continuous shift towards a tertiary-based economy.27 CEDEFOP forecasts that by 2020 there 
will be job opportunities in all occupations but their distribution will be uneven. New jobs 
will be concentrated in higher- and lower-skill level jobs, with slower growth in middle 
occupations.28 
Job polarisation is a key contributor to inequality. The concentration of wage growth among 
high-skilled workers combined with the disproportionate job growth at the upper and lower 
ends of the skill distribution has resulted in a more unequal economic environment in the 
United States. The literature on educational expansion suggests that with a general extension 
of education, the demand for less-educated workers declines. As the low-skilled become a 
minority, they are perceived as increasingly incapable: while educational attainment acts as a 
signal for the applicants’ productivity and their ability to learn, the lack of it acts as a signal 
for failure. This phenomenon has been termed stigmatisation by negative selection. 29  This 
                                                   
26 For a review of literature, see I. Maselli (2012), “The Evolving Supply and Demand of Skills in the 
Labour Market”, Intereconomics, Vol. 47, No. 1, pp. 22-30 or L. Kureková, M. Beblavý, C. Haita and A. 
Thum (2013), “Demand for Less-Skilled Workers across Europe: Between Formal Qualifications and 
Non-Cognitive Skills”, NEUJOBS Working Paper 4.3.3, NEUJOBS FP7 Research Project, February 
(http://www.neujobs.eu/). 
27 CEDEFOP (2011), “Labour-Market Polarisation and Elementary Occupations in Europe. Blip or 
Long-Term Trend?”, CEDEFOP Research Paper No. 9, Publications Office of the European Union, 
Luxembourg. 
28 CEDEFOP (2012), “Europe’s Skill Challenge”, Briefing Note, March. 
29  H. Solga (2002), “Stigmatization by Negative Selection. Explaining Less - Educated People’s 
Decreasing Employment”, European Sociological Review, Vol. 18, No. 2, pp. 159-178. 
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stigmatisation was confirmed empirically by showing that in countries with a low share of 
low-educated (e.g. as in Norway or Switzerland), the unemployment risk of the low-skilled 
(defined as ISCED0/1/2) is the highest. Conversely, in countries with high shares of low-
skilled (as in Portugal, Spain), the unemployment risk of this group is low. In conclusion, the 
job market opportunities of the low-skilled depend crucially on employers’ beliefs and 
perceptions about the relationship between applicants’ education and their future 
productivity. It is therefore reasonable to assume that with the expanding educational sector, 
we will see a continuing replacement of low-skilled by medium-skilled.  
For the medium-skilled, this means that they might temporarily assume positions for which 
they are overqualified. The overeducation and the mismatch in the labour market receive a 
great deal of policy attention. However, Ramos et al.30  argue that even when qualified 
workers are unable to find suitable jobs, they are still more productive at the aggregate level 
than their unqualified counterparts. This implies that there is a good case for public 
investment in education and its further expansion even though a number of recent studies 
fail to provide favourable evidence regarding the link between human capital and growth. 
They warn that regions might not benefit directly from their investment in the education in 
the context of high geographical mobility. 
The final lesson to be derived is that the skills content of the low-skilled jobs has increased, 
leading to the phenomenon of up-skilling.31 Low-skillness should therefore be viewed as a 
fluid concept, whose definition depends on the context. Job polarisation may therefore be a 
misleading concept because low-skillness encompasses a wide range of jobs. 
5. Are new green skills different? Important? 
The ‘greening’ of the economy could reverse job polarisation trends. Whereas the ICT 
revolution had mostly benefited high-skilled job-seekers,32  the greening of the economy 
could favour both high-skilled and medium-skilled workers. However, a lot depends on the 
pace and the depth of the greening of European economies. For example, Colijn33 argues that 
only 3.25% of the total number of job vacancies announced in the European Union in 2012 
were ‘green’, i.e. supporting the use of renewable energy or a reduction in the use of non-
renewable energy. When taking into account ‘near green’ jobs, i.e. jobs that work in support 
of the green economy, approximately 6.9% of jobs demanded were in or supporting the 
green economy. Figure 4 depicts green and near-green jobs as a percentage of total demand 
by country. The highest demand for green jobs comes from the Scandinavian countries, 
whereas Central and Eastern European countries are lagging behind. 
                                                   
30 R. Ramos, J. Suriñach and M. Artís (2009), “Regional Economic Growth and Human Capital: The 
Role of Overeducation”, IZA Discussion Paper No. 4453, IZA, Bonn, September. 
31 See L. Kureková, M. Beblavý and C. Haita (2013b), “Qualifications Or Soft Skills? Studying Job 
Advertisements for Demand for Low-Skilled Staff in Slovakia”, NEUJOBS Working Paper 4.3.3, 
NEUJOBS FP7 Research Project, August (http://www.neujobs.eu/); L. Kureková, M. Beblavý, C. 
Haita and A. Thum (2013), “Demand for Low- and Medium-Skilled Workers across Europe: between 
Formal Qualifications and Non-Cognitive Skills”, NEUJOBS Working Paper 4.3.3, NEUJOBS FP7 
Research Project, February (http://www.neujobs.eu/).  
32 I. Maselli. (2012), “The Evolving Supply and Demand of Skills in the Labour Market”, Intereconomics, 
Vol. 47, No. 1, p. 23 and see also R. Massari, P. Naticchioni and G. Ragusa (2013), “Unconditional and 
Conditional Wage Polarization in Europe”, NEUJOBS Working Paper No. D3.6, NEUJOBS FP7 
Research Project, March (http://www.neujobs.eu/). 
33 B. Colijn (2013), “Green Jobs in Europe and the Increasing Demand for Technical Skills”, NEUJOBS 
Working Paper No. 4.2, NEUJOBS FP7 Research Project (http://www.neujobs.eu/). 
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Figure 4. Green and near-green job demand as a percentage of total demand by country 
 
Note: Countries with fewer than 800 observations were omitted from the sample. 
Source: B. Colijn (2013), “Green Jobs in Europe and the Increasing Demand for Technical Skills”, 
NEUJOBS Working Paper No. 4.2, NEUJOBS FP7 Research Project (http://www.neujobs.eu/). 
Furthermore, he argues that the types of jobs that are green are concentrated in certain 
sectors, such as farming, fishing and forestry, architecture and engineering and construction 
and extraction. More than 10% of jobs in these sectors have a green component. Jobs that are 
purely green include engineers, managers and installation workers, maintenance and repair 
workers. This suggests that the greening of the economy is driven by people developing 
technology and those working around them. The positive relationship between green jobs 
and technological skills implies that the greening of the economy could provide a 
counterweight to the hollowing out of the medium-skilled jobs. 
6. The surprisingly demanding nature of “low-skilled” jobs 
Our research identifies the skills and characteristics demanded in the Slovak labour market 
in selected low- and medium-skilled occupations.34 The labour demand was analysed at the 
micro-level and relied on the analysis of job ads from the Slovak job portal Profesia. In this 
paper, we examined what skills employers look for in an employee in a set of ostensibly 
lower-skilled jobs. The research was conducted in the context of continuing high 
unemployment across the developed world and a debate about what role skills and 
upskilling can play in alleviating the problem. The focus on the lower-skilled was motivated 
by several factors – their generally lower employment rates, reports of skill polarisation 
towards high and low-skilled occupations, accompanied by a process of displacement of the 
low-skilled by the more educated workers as well as the rising skill requirements and task 
complexity within all occupational categories and skill levels. 
                                                   
34 See L. Kureková, M. Beblavý and C. Haita (2013b), “Qualifications Or Soft Skills? Studying Job 
Advertisements For Demand For Low-Skilled Staff In Slovakia”, NEUJOBS Working Paper 4.3.3, 
NEUJOBS FP7 Research Project, August (http://www.neujobs.eu/). 
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To this end, we analysed labour demand at the micro-level by studying content of job 
advertisements to identify specific skills and characteristics that are demanded in the Slovak 
labour market in selected low- and medium-skilled occupations. Our work is innovative in 
exploring online job ads data and quantifying different skills, personal attributes and 
characteristics. It shows that online portals can potentially become a very useful source of 
information about content of demand and in improving generally weak statistics of 
vacancies generated through other sources. We contribute to those works that emphasise the 
need to analyse labour market demand at the micro-level and use job advertisements as a 
source of information about the employer’s demand. The implications of our work spill over 
into a number of areas and contexts. 
Employers in the Slovak labour market are quite demanding even for lower-skilled jobs. A 
general finding of our analysis is that ‘ideal’ low- and medium-skilled worker needs to 
demonstrate a considerable set of skills and qualities. Unlike in the US, employer demand 
focuses on non-cognitive skills and specific cognitive skills rather than general cognitive 
skills. With respect to specific cognitive skills, language abilities are required to a large extent 
across a majority of occupations, including those where a low-level of education is expected 
(such as chambermaids and cleaners). Among non-cognitive personal skills, being 
responsible and flexible are the most pronounced characteristics. Among social skills, the 
ability to communicate is the most requested skill across occupations on average.  
However, we also found that the specificity of skill requirements differs vastly between 
different types of low- and medium-skilled jobs and is linked to the interactive nature of the 
job, rather than the education or experience required. All in all, we concur with the US 
findings that a ‘basic skills package’ now exists even for lower-skilled jobs, but the structure 
of that package can differ substantially across countries as well as across sectors of the 
economy. 
With regard to formal credentials, we found that a high level of formal education in the 
country is associated with a difficult position of workers with low education even for jobs 
that should not require higher formal credentials. Even for jobs that are marked as 
‘elementary’ in the International Classification of Occupation (ISCO), Slovak employers now 
tend to require upper secondary education. Overall, our research indicates that the term 
‘low-skilled jobs’ might be a misnomer, both with regard to actual skills required as well as 
the formal educational credentials demanded.  
We also looked at how formal classifications and real-world requirements interact. We found 
that the relationship between job sophistication in the international ISCO classification and 
actual employer requirements is weak, but present. We also found that, for ‘new’ 
occupations, employers are less able to agree on the required education level than for the rest 
of the sample. 
When looking at the formal educational level, employers expect secondary education 
without necessarily having completed the ‘leaving examination’ (3-year specialised 
vocational study) as a minimum standard in the majority of analysed occupations. However, 
employers’ expectations about minimum education requirement varied, with the variance 
being higher in the case of new occupations as opposed to codified or traditional service or 
industry occupations. In a number of new occupations, such as courier, caretaker or au-pair, 
employers requested complete secondary education (4-year general or specialised with a 
leaving examination). This suggests that demand in the labour market might have adapted 
to the supply which continues to be better and better educated; this is reflected in an initially 
higher formal qualification expected even in the medium-skilled labour market segment, at 
least in comparison to the more typical medium-skilled occupations. In contrast to the above, 
there are also examples of underqualification in the case of new occupations. For example, 
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the lowest primary education level prevailed for the security guard, who belongs to service 
workers (ISCO 5).  
We offered also a comparative look at the issue of the type of skills demanded in the low-
skilled sector.35 An analysis of online job adds from EURES website in three different small 
economies – Czech Republic, Denmark and Ireland – suggests that the specific skill-set 
demanded in service occupations differs from other, mainly industry-connected jobs, in the 
greater focus given to non-cognitive social skills and personal characteristics. There is a great 
variation in the content of skill demand across the analysed labour markets.  
In two studies, however, we also suggested that low-skillness is not a static state but a 
dynamic process.36 In the past, we observed the de-skilling of some occupations, such as 
accounting, and up-skilling of others, such as journalism. We conceptualise low-skillness as a 
process rather than just regarding it as a status characterising the workers alone.37 Such an 
approach enables us to problematise the existing conceptualisations of low-skillness, which 
typically do not move beyond the measurement of the low-skilled through the lowest 
attained level of qualification (ISCED 0-2). However, such a conceptualisation ignores the 
heterogeneity of the low-skilled. To overcome these deficiencies, we propose an alternative 
typology. In addition to the typically included ‘low-educated’, the typology includes 
categories of workers who might be formally well-educated, experienced and trained but 
have been drawn into low-skillness as an outcome of structural forces or institutional 
barriers. Examples include people with obsolete skills, displaced workers or ‘temporarily 
low-skilled’ migrant workers. The proposed categories are then used to empirically test the 
quantitative differences across the EU countries. The aim is to understand how the low-
skilled differ within them and how structural processes and individual characteristics 
interact in various ways in the dynamic labour market. 
We find that the formal qualification levels are valued differently in different labour 
markets. This conclusion arises from the fact that while the low (ISCED 0-2) and medium 
(ISCED 3-4) qualifications are substitutes in employment across the EU countries, the low 
(ISCO 9) and middle-skilled occupations (ISCO 4-8) do not preserve this property across the 
EU countries.  This implies that people with the same educational level are employed in 
occupations of different skills requirements across the EU labour markets. 
As shown in Figure 5, competition for jobs takes place within the age cohorts across different 
levels of formal education, and not between age cohorts. Among the young workers, 
competition for jobs takes place between medium-educated and low-educated while among 
the older workers, the medium-skilled compete with the highly educated workers in the 
same age groups. Contrary to the literature and general policy discourse, we found that it is 
more the young workers who tend to suffer in the labour market. Specifically, the young are 
always at greater risk of unemployment than the old, regardless of the qualification level.  
                                                   
35 L. Kureková, M. Beblavý, C. Haita and A. Thum (2013), “Demand for Less-Skilled Workers across 
Europe: Between Formal Qualifications and Non-Cognitive Skills”, NEUJOBS Working Paper 4.3.3, 
NEUJOBS FP7 Research Project, February (http://www.neujobs.eu/). 
36 I. Maselli (2012), “The Evolving Supply and Demand of Skills in the Labour Market”, Intereconomics, 
Vol. 47, No. 1, p. 28 and L. Kureková, C. Haita and M. Beblavý (2013a), “Being and Becoming Low-
Skilled: A Comprehensive Approach to Studying Low-Skillness”, NEUJOBS Working Paper No. 4.3.1, 
NEUJOBS FP7 Research Project, February (http://www.neujobs.eu/). 
37  L. Kureková, C. Haita and M. Beblavý (2013a), “Being and Becoming Low-Skilled: A 
Comprehensive Approach to Studying Low-Skillness”, NEUJOBS Working Paper No. 4.3.1, NEUJOBS 
FP7 Research Project, February (http://www.neujobs.eu/). 
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Figure 5. Relative unemployment 
 
 
 
Source: L. Kureková, C. Haita and M. Beblavý (2013a), “Being and Becoming Low-Skilled: A 
Comprehensive Approach to Studying Low-Skillness”, NEUJOBS Working Paper No. 4.3.1, 
NEUJOBS FP7 Research Project, February, p. 62 (http://www.neujobs.eu/). 
In most countries, the elementary occupations (ISCO 9) appear to shrink more than the 
middle-skilled occupations (ISCO 4-8), but this is linked to the overall shrinkage in the 
labour demand of the country. This is in contrast to the literature which argues for the 
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presence of skill polarisation and decline in middle-level occupations. We interpret our 
finding to suggest that a displacement of the employed in the elementary occupations into 
unemployment by workers from the upper-skilled occupations is taking place.  
With respect to skill obsolescence, we analyse unemployment and inactivity rates of the 
cohort of 35-39 years of age in 1995 (50-54 years old in 2010) to provide a dynamic view. As 
shown in Figure 6, the given age cohort not only becomes less employable as it advances in 
age, but a large share of its members drops out of the labour market into inactivity by the 
end of their working life. The sharpest changes are found in the CEECs (Romania, Poland, 
Slovenia, Bulgaria and Slovakia), which experienced a rampant structural change and 
reformed their economic systems from socialist into market economies.  
Figure 6. Labour market status: Old vs. prime age 
  
 
Source: L. Kureková, C. Haita and M. Beblavý (2013a), “Being and Becoming Low-Skilled: A 
Comprehensive Approach to Studying Low-Skillness”, NEUJOBS Working Paper No. 4.3.1, 
NEUJOBS FP7 Research Project, February, p. 79 (http://www.neujobs.eu/). 
On the subjective level, however, skills obsolescence (measured as the need for further 
training in order to be able to perform job tasks) is reported more by young people than by 
older workers. Equal shares in all generations perceive to have skills enabling them to 
perform more demanding tasks. This should not be seen as a contradiction to an earlier 
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finding as older workers might be out of the labour market (and therefore not captured in 
the survey) while with respect to the youth it signals a lack of experience or practical skills 
rather than skills obsolescence as such.  
The detachment from the labour market (defined as being unemployed for 4 years or longer) 
resembles the structure of the overall working population in a given country. This implies 
that the labour market segment we find to be the most affected by detachment is not 
independent from the general education structure, which justifies our proposition to go 
beyond the ISCED 0-2 measure in empirical investigations of low-skillness. 
7. Back to school? How people up-skill during their lives differs 
across Europe 
Our research38 also explored different aspects of the lifelong learning, i.e. adult on-job or 
informal training and formal training leading to an increase in ISCED. We wanted to 
examine 1) whether the lifelong learning differs across age cohorts and 2) whether adult 
learning takes place in terms of ‘going back to school’ (ISCED level upskilling) and/or only 
in terms of training. To answer these questions we constructed synthetic panels based on the 
European Labour Force Survey 2000-2010 waves for 27 European countries.  
The results imply that older-age cohorts are less likely to participate in training. However, 
this effect is less significant for going back to school. The probability of getting a higher-
education degree after 20-years of age sharply decreases with age. However, this does not 
hold true for lower ISCED levels: getting an upper-secondary degree is more frequent for 
people with greater on-the-job experience. Furthermore, lifelong learning is determined also 
by individual characteristics. Whereas men and immigrants are more likely to get an upper-
secondary degree in their adult life, natives are more likely to achieve tertiary educational 
achievement. Contrary to the existing literature, our results imply that higher-educated 
individuals tend to participate less in training than other education ranges.  
Although individual characteristics, such as age, gender, education level and professional 
activity, account for a large part of country heterogeneity, the preference of training to 
formal ISCED upgrading and vice versa suggests that these individual characteristics are 
mediated by the institutional setting. When we grouped countries by the level of up-skilling 
either through training or formal ISCED upgrade, we found that – relative to the base 
country Austria – three types of countries emerged: those that score high on both dimensions 
and those that score high on one dimension but not the other (see Figure 4 below). 
                                                   
38 M. Beblavý, A. Thum and G. Potjagailo (2013), “Where and When Does Adult Learning Happen? A 
Cohort Analysis of Adult Education in Europe”, NEUJOBS Working Paper No. 4.3.2, NEUJOBS FP7 
Research Project, May (http://www.neujobs.eu/). 
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Figure 7. Training and ISCED up-skilling: A comparison of European countries compared with 
Austria 
 
Source: M. Beblavý, A. Thum and G. Potjagailo (2013), “Where and When Does Adult Learning 
Happen? A Cohort Analysis of Adult Education in Europe”, NEUJOBS Working Paper No. 
4.3.2, NEUJOBS FP7 Research Project, May, p. 26 (http://www.neujobs.eu/). 
Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands score high on the training dimension but low on 
the ISCED up-skilling. This may be a result of education levels that are already high or 
training that does lead to degrees that upgrade the ISCED level. Relatively high levels of 
upskilling but low levels of training can be found in the post-communist Visegrad Four 
countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) , Romania and Italy. This 
suggests that the formal degree is valued highly in the labour market so that people are 
willing to make this ‘lumpy’ investment.  
These inter-country differences should be kept in mind by both EU and national policy-
makers. In the countries of Central Europe, the focus on quality and accessibility of upper-
secondary and higher education appears also to be the most effective lifelong learning 
policy, whereas in the Scandinavian countries, the focus should be on employers and the 
training they provide. 
These patterns of up-skilling also have implications for equality. Firms tend to invest in 
training of those workers whose training leads to the highest increase in productivity, i.e. 
managers and skilled workers.39 The position of low-skilled, older or immigrant workers will 
be therefore more favourable in countries with a tradition of publicly-funded lifelong and 
                                                   
39 F. van Wieringen (1999), “Scenario Planning for Vocational and Adult Education”, European Journal 
of Education, Vol. 34, No. 2, p. 164. 
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adult learning. Furthermore, it is reasonable to assume that with the expansion of the tertiary 
education and the growing competition from educated younger cohorts, older cohorts 
and/or less-educated workers will seek further education to remain competitive in the 
labour market. 
8. Conclusion 
This Working Document has examined whether the current trends in the areas of education 
and skills are pushing the European Union, composed of 28 member states and hundreds of 
millions of citizens, towards convergence or polarisation. It is based on nearly 20 papers 
produced on skills and education topics within the NEUJOBS project. We covered a wide 
range of issues that defy any easy or neat answers, but several cross-cutting messages 
emerge from the research. 
There are undoubtedly powerful forces pushing for more polarisation, particularly in the 
labour market. In most European countries, destruction or lower growth of routine, middle-
skill jobs can be observed. This has important implications also for the low-skilled as the 
displaced middle-skilled individuals are more likely to compete and push them out. As 
employers adjust job content and requirements to this fact, as well as the gradual upskilling 
of the population, nominally ‘low-skilled’ jobs can be surprisingly demanding. However, the 
demands can be manifested in very different forms, and the skill-intensity of a position and 
its formal educational requirements are often wide apart.  
This leads to reassessment of what is a skill and how people acquire it. We demonstrated 
that there is increasing complexity in what a ‘low-skilled’ person is and how well (or poorly) 
s/he fares in the labour market. The accelerating upskilling of populations in developed 
countries points to a not-too-distant future where higher education will be somewhere 
between a mass and universal phenomenon. At the same time, the importance of experience 
is likely to grow, with implications for the prospects of labour market entrants. 
How policy-makers handle these developments and contribute to more rather than less 
equality of opportunity is a question to which there are no easy answers. Polarisation is 
likely to increase socio-economic inequalities within societies along ethnic, gender and age 
lines. Our research confirmed that early childhood education plays an important role, and it 
also appears to be increasingly uncontested as a policy prescription. However, the other 
frequently emphasised remedy – less selection in secondary education, particularly later 
division of children into separate tracks – is more problematic. Its effectiveness depends on 
the country in question and the target group, while education systems are extremely difficult 
to shift even on a long-term basis. A different, more-nuanced type of warning to policy-
makers is delivered in our research on returns to higher education by field of study, which 
showed hidden rationality in how students choose their major. It is always tempting to 
assume people do not know what they are doing, but that assumption should always be 
carefully checked. European policies also need to be mindful of different ways in which 
national systems deal with the need for upskilling. 
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